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An important metric of the performance of a quantum secret sharing scheme is its information rate. Beyond
the fact that the information rate is upper bounded by one, very little is known in terms of bounds on the
information rate of quantum secret sharing schemes. Further, not every scheme can be realized with rate one. In
this paper we derive new upper bounds for the information rates of quantum secret sharing schemes. We show
that there exist quantum access structures on n players for which the information rate cannot be better than
O((log
2
n)/n). These results are the quantum analogues of the bounds for classical secret sharing schemes
proved by Csirmaz.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum secret sharing is a cryptographic protocol to dis-
tribute a secret state (either classical or quantum) among a
group of playersP , such that only authorized subsets of P can
reconstruct the secret state from the distributed quantum states
[1, 2]. The quantum state distributed to each party is called a
share. The collection of authorized sets is called the access
structure of the scheme. Two important problems related to
quantum secret sharing are the construction of efficient secret
sharing schemes for various access structures [3, 4] and estab-
lishing the bounds on the efficiency of secret sharing schemes
[3, 6]. Despite the rapid growth of the field since its incep-
tion in [1], see for instance [2–13] and the references therein,
bounds on the efficiency of quantum secret sharing schemes
are hard to come by. The main purpose of this paper is to
report some progress on this problem.
The efficiency of a quantum secret sharing scheme is quan-
tified by its information rate. Informally, this is defined as the
ratio of the size of the secret to the size of the largest share, (a
precise definition will be given later). The importance of the
information rate can be understood as follows. Smaller the
rate, larger are the sizes of the shares and the overhead costs
of storage and communication. As the shares are to be kept se-
cret, the security of the protocol can be undermined by large
shares. For these reasons it is beneficial to design schemes
with high information rate.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect if unauthorized
sets cannot extract any information about the secret. In such
schemes the size of the share must be at least the size of the se-
cret [3, 6]. Therefore the information rate of perfect quantum
secret sharing schemes is upper bounded by one. Given an
access structure it is not always possible to construct schemes
which realize the access structure with information rate one.
Therefore, we would like to know bounds on the sizes of the
shares for a given access structure. Both Gottesman [3] and
Smith [4] have given constructions for general access struc-
tures. These constructions provide implicitly lower bounds
for the information rate of quantum secret sharing schemes.
∗ pradeep@phas.ubc.ca
In these constructions, the size of a share can be exponentially
larger than the size of the secret.
At the other end we could ask what is the minimum size of
share “required” to implement an access structure on n partic-
ipants. This question is difficult to answer unless we impose
some restrictions on the access structures. We study the in-
formation rate of a specific type of access structures and show
that for these the size of a share must be at least O(n/ log2 n)
larger than the size of the secret. These results are quantum
analogues of the bounds for classical secret sharing schemes
proved by Csirmaz [14].
In this paper we restrict our attention to perfect quantum
secret sharing schemes where the secret is a quantum state.
Bounds on quantum secret sharing schemes which share a
classical secret are not dealt with in this paper.
A. Background
In this section we will briefly review some of the necessary
background and notation used in the paper. We denote the par-
ticipants of a secret sharing scheme by P , typically assumed
to be the set P = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The access structure of a se-
cret sharing is denoted by Γ. A special type of authorized set
is one whose proper subsets are unauthorized. The collection
of minimal authorized sets of an access structure Γ is denoted
as Γmin. The notation 2P is for the collection of all subsets of
P . We denote the complement of A ⊆ P by A¯ = P \ A. An
access structure is said to be monotone if and only if for any
A ∈ Γ, any set containing A is also in Γ. Given Γ we define
the dual access structure as Γ∗ = {A¯ | A 6∈ Γ}. An access
structure is said to be self-dual if Γ = Γ∗.
An access structure that can be realized by quantum secret
sharing schemes is called a quantum access structure. Due
to the no-cloning theorem [15, 16], quantum access structures
satisfy the following requirements:
Fact 1 ([2]). In a quantum access structure, the complement
of an authorized set is unauthorized.
Fact 2 ([3]). An access structure is a quantum access struc-
ture if and only if it is monotone and no two authorized sets
are disjoint.
2Our analysis of quantum secret sharing schemes is infor-
mation theoretic. Therefore, we quickly recall some of the
relevant notions of quantum information. Given a density ma-
trix ρ we denote its von Neumann entropy as S(ρ) which is
defined as
S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ). (1)
Sometimes we have to find the entropy of a set of quantum
systems indexed by a set A. In such situations, we denote the
von Neumann entropy of a system A as S(A) where
S(A) = −Tr(ρA log2 ρA), (2)
and ρA is the (reduced) density matrix of A. In this paper
unless otherwise specified entropy refers to the von Neumann
entropy. The mutual information between two systems A and
B is denoted by I(A : B) and
I(A : B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(A,B). (3)
A very useful inequality relating the entropy of three systems
A,B,C is the strong subadditivity inequality:
S(A,C) + S(B,C) ≥ S(A,B,C) + S(C). (4)
A slightly different statement of the above inequality will be
useful to us. Because we can associate the arguments of S(·)
to an index set V , we can also regard entropy as a set function
i.e. S : 2V → R. Then it becomes clear that entropy is a
submodular function, in other words, it satisfies
S(X) + S(Y ) ≥ S(X ∪ Y ) + S(X ∩ Y ). (5)
To show this let C = X ∩ Y , A = X \ C and B = Y \ C.
Then substituting forA,B,C in equation (4) we obtain S(X\
(X ∩ Y ), X ∩ Y ) + S(Y \ (X ∩ Y ), X ∩ Y ) ≥ S(X \ (X ∩
Y ), Y \ (X ∩ Y ), X ∩ Y ) + S(X ∩ Y ) which simplifies to
equation (5).
An information theoretic model for quantum secret sharing
schemes was proposed in [6]. As we make significant use of
this framework to prove our results we provide a brief review
of this model.
We denote the Hilbert space of a system A by HA. Let S
be the secret to be distributed and let HS be the associated
Hilbert space. We assume that ρS =
∑
i∈Fq
αi|i〉〈i|. The
secret is purified using a reference system R to give a pure
state |RS〉. Then
S(R) = S(S) (6)
Assume that the set of players is given by P = {1, . . . , n}. A
distribution of shares for the quantum secret sharing scheme
is defined to be a completely positive trace preserving map ∆
∆ : HRS → HR ⊗HP , (7)
such that for every authorized set A ⊆ P there exists a re-
covery map 1R ⊗ RA : HR ⊗ HA → HRS that maps
ρRA 7→ |RS〉〈RS|. The information rate of the quantum se-
cret sharing scheme is defined as
κ =
S(S)
maxi S(i)
. (8)
The information theoretic model provides the following
characterization of quantum secret sharing schemes [6]:
Lemma 1. In a perfect quantum secret sharing scheme with
access structure Γ we must have
I(A : R) = I(A : S) = 2S(S) for all A ∈ Γ (9)
I(A : R) = I(A : S) = 0 for all A 6∈ Γ (10)
The first condition has been called the recoverability re-
quirement while the second has been termed secrecy require-
ment. We also need the following lemma, although an imme-
diate consequence of Lemma 1, we include it for complete-
ness.
Lemma 2. Let A ∈ Γ. Then we have the following relations.
S(A) =
1
2
I(A : A¯) + S(S) (11)
S(A¯) =
1
2
I(A : A¯) (12)
S(A)− S(A¯) = S(S) (13)
Proof. If A ∈ Γ, then A¯ 6∈ Γ. Computing I(A : A¯) we obtain
I(A : A¯) = S(A) + S(A¯)− S(A, A¯) (14)
= S(A) + S(A¯)− S(R) (15)
= S(A) + S(A,R)− S(S)
= S(A) + S(A) + S(R)− I(A : R)− S(S)
= 2S(A)− 2S(S),
which gives us the first relation. Substituting for S(A) in
equation (14) gives us the second relation.
I(A : A¯) = I(A : A¯)/2 + S(S) + S(A¯)− S(S)
The last relation is immediate from the previous two equa-
tions.
II. BOUNDS ON THE INFORMATION RATE
In this section we derive lower bounds on the size of shares
(in terms of the von Neumann entropy) and thus compute up-
per bounds on the information rate. The main result of this
section is a lower bound on the size of shares for a class of ac-
cess structures. A similar result was shown for classical secret
sharing schemes by Csirmaz [14].
Lemma 3. Given a perfect quantum secret sharing scheme
with access structure Γ, for any A ⊆ P , one of the following
must hold:
S(A,R) = S(A)− S(S) if A ∈ Γ (16)
S(A,R) = S(A) + S(S) if A 6∈ Γ (17)
Proof. For any subset A, using the definition of mutual infor-
mation in equation (3)
S(A,R) = S(A) + S(R)− I(A : R)
S(A,R) = S(A) + S(S)− I(A : R), (18)
where we have used equation (6) in the last step. By Lemma 1,
we know that I(A : R) = 2S(S) if A ∈ Γ and I(A : R) = 0
otherwise. Substituting these values in equation (18) we get
the stated result.
3Lemma 4. Let A,B be any two authorized sets such that A∩
B is not authorized. Then we have the following inequality:
S(A) + S(B) ≥ S(A ∪B) + S(A ∩B) + 2S(S). (19)
Proof. By using Lemma 3, we can write S(A) + S(B) as
S(A) + S(B) = S(A ∪R) + S(B ∪R) + 2S(S)
≥ S(A ∪B ∪R) + S((A ∩B) ∪R) + 2S(S)
where we used the subadditivity inequality in the last equa-
tion. Once again using Lemma 3 and simplifying, we obtain
S(A) + S(B) ≥ S(A ∪B) + S((A ∩B)) + 2S(S)
as stated.
A. The General Case with n Parties
Definition (Csirmaz Access Structure). Given an integer n ≥
4, let k be the largest integer such that n ≥ 2k − 2 + k. Let
A ⊂ P be such that |A| = k. Consider all the 2k subsets
of A enumerated in the order of decreasing cardinality. Let
B = P \ A = {b1, . . . , bn−k}. Let B0 = ∅, B2k−2 = B
and Bi = {b1, . . . , bi} for 0 < i < 2k − 2. Let Γ(n)min be the
minimal access structure given as below:
Γ
(n)
min = {Ai ∪Bi | 0 ≤ i < 2
k − 1}. (20)
We emphasize that in these access structures, we have Ai ∩
Bj = ∅, Ai 6⊂ Aj if i < j and Bi 6⊂ Bj if i > j. As an aside
we note that the access structure defined above departs from
the one originally proposed by Csirmaz [14] in the definition
of the minimal authorized setB2k−2 and secondly, it is always
connected i.e., every party occurs in some minimal authorized
set. It is easy to see that this is a minimal access structure. If
it is not, then for some distinct i, j we must have Ai ∪ Bi (
Aj ∪ Bj , then it follows that Ai ⊆ Aj and Bi ⊆ Bj . This
implies i ≥ j and i ≤ j, which is impossible for i 6= j.
Lemma 5. The access structure Γ(n)min, defined in equa-
tion (20), is a quantum access structure.
Proof. The elements of the minimal access structure Γ(n)min are
given by
Mi = Ai ∪Bi for 0 ≤ i < 2k − 1 (21)
Consider Mi ∩Mj for any i 6= j. Then because Ak ∩Bl = ∅
for any k, l we have
Mi ∩Mj = (Ai ∩ Aj) ∪ (Bi ∩Bj).
Without loss of generality we can assume that i < j. If i =
0, then B0 = ∅ and A0 = A ) Aj for all j. Therefore
M0 ∩Mj = Aj 6= ∅. If i 6= 0, then we have Bi 6= ∅ and by
construction Bi ( Bj . Thus we have Mi ∩Mj ⊇ Bi 6= ∅.
Thus we always have Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅. Thus by Fact 2,Γ(n)min is
a quantum access structure.
It turns out that the access structure Γ(n) is not self-dual.
For instance, the set Ai ∪ Bi−1 for i > 1 is unauthorized as
well its complement (A\Ai)∪(B\Bi−1) is also unauthorized.
For a technical reason in the computation of the entropies, it
is much more convenient to work with self-dual access struc-
tures. For this reason we need the following notion introduced
by Gottesman [3].
Purification of Access Structures: An access structure Γ
on a set of players P = {1, 2, . . . , n} that is not self-dual can
be “purified” to give a self-dual access structure Γ on a set of
players P ′ = {1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1} by
i) Adding an additional party, n+ 1.
ii) Additional authorized sets, created from unauthorized
sets of original structure and having the following form:
{A ∪ {n+ 1} | A 6∈ Γ;P \A 6∈ Γ}.
The additional authorized sets all contain the party {n+1}.
These sets are created from a pair sets A and P \ A such that
both are not in Γ, i.e., both are unauthorized. Purification con-
verts one of them to an authorized set in Γ along with addi-
tional party. Thus A ∪ {n+ 1} ∈ Γ but P \A 6∈ Γ.
Remark. It is important to note that all the authorized sets
of Γ are also authorized sets of its purification Γ and all the
unauthorized sets of Γ are unauthorized in Γ.
Purification of access structures was introduced by Gottes-
man in [3]. Purification of access structures is useful in that
it gives an access structure that has a pure-state secret sharing
scheme and the scheme for the original access structure can
be obtained by discarding the share that has been added. We
recover the original access structure by discarding the share
associated with {n+ 1}.
The following theorem closely follows the structure of [14,
Theorem 3.2, Lemma 3.3–3.4], but note that the results therein
do not apply in the quantum setting. Firstly, because the
model of quantum secret sharing schemes is different and
secondly, despite the similarity of the access structures, the
proofs in [14] invoke the use a (polymatroidal) function which
is assumed to be monotonic and submodular. The von Neu-
mann entropy, as is well-known, does not satisfy the assump-
tion of monotonicity.
Theorem 6. Let Γ(n−1) be a purification of an access struc-
ture defined as in equation (20). Then in any realization of
Γ
(n−1)
there exists some share i for which S(i)/S(S) ≥
((2k+1 − 1)/(2k + 1)) = O(n/ log2 n).
Proof. We assume that Γ(n−1) is defined on P =
{1, 2, . . . , n − 1} and its purification Γ(n−1) is defined on
P ′ = {1, 2, . . . , n − 1, n} The idea behind the proof is to
obtain a lower bound on the entropy of a subset of P ′. Our
aim will be to get a lower bound on the entropy of a subset
A ⊆ {1, . . . , n − 1, n} such as S(A) ≥ αS(S). Then using
the fact that S(A) ≤ S(i)|A| for some i ∈ P ′, we can lower
bound the size of the ith share as αS(S)/|A|.
Let Xi = Bi∪A and Yi = Ai+1 ∪Bi+1. First observe that
Xi, Yi are both authorized sets as Xi ⊃ Mi and Yi ⊃ Mi+1.
4Furthermore,Xi ∩ Yi = Ai+1 ∪Bi is unauthorized. Suppose
on the contrary that Xi ∩ Yi is authorized; then for some j we
must have Mj = Aj ∪Bj ⊆ Ai+1 ∪Bi. Since Al ∩Bm = ∅
for all choice of l and m, this implies that Aj ⊆ Ai+1 and
Bj ⊆ Bi, which can only hold if j ≥ i + 1 and j ≤ i giving
us a contradiction. Therefore Xi ∩ Yi is unauthorized and we
can apply Lemma 4 which gives us
S(Xi) + S(Yi) ≥ S(Xi ∪ Yi) + S(Xi ∩ Yi) + 2S(S).
This can be rewritten as
S(A ∪Bi) + S(Ai+1 ∪Bi+1) ≥ S(A ∪Bi+1) + 2S(S)
+ S(Ai+1 ∪Bi).
Now we apply submodularity inequality to the sets Ai+1 ∪Bi
and Bi+1:
S(Ai+1 ∪Bi) + S(Bi+1) ≥ S(Ai+1 ∪Bi+1) + S(Bi).
Adding the previous two inequalities we obtain
S(A ∪Bi) + S(Bi+1) ≥ S(A ∪Bi+1) + S(Bi) + 2S(S)
Clearly, this inequality holds for all 0 ≤ i < 2k − 2. Adding
them all up we obtain
2k−3∑
i=0
S(A ∪Bi) + S(Bi+1) ≥
2k−3∑
i=0
S(A ∪Bi+1) + S(Bi)
+ (2k − 2)2S(S)
S(A ∪B0) + S(B2k−2) ≥ S(A ∪B2k−2) + S(B0)
+ (2k − 2)2S(S)
As B0 = ∅, this reduces to
S(A) + S(B2k−2) ≥ S(A ∪B2k−2) + (2
k − 2)2S(S)
SinceA∪B2k−2 is authorized its complement is unauthorized
by Fact 1 and by Lemma 2, S(A∪B2k−2) = S(A ∪B2k−2)+
S(S) ≥ 2S(S), where we also used the fact that S(Z) ≥
S(S) for any unauthorized set Z , [6, Theorem 6], see also [3,
Theorem 4]. Therefore we now have
S(A) + S(B2k−2) ≥ (2
k − 1)2S(S)
By Lemma 2, S(B2k−2) = S(B2k−2) = S(A,R, n) ≤
S(A,R)+S(R, n)−S(S) = S(A)+S(n)−S(S), therefore
we obtain
2S(A) + S(n)− S(S) ≥ (2k − 1)2S(S)
2S(A) + S(n) ≥ (2k+1 − 1)S(S)
But S(A) ≤
∑k
i=1 S(i), hence
S(n) +
k∑
i=1
2S(i) ≥ (2k+1 − 1)S(S).
Hence for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k or i = n, we must have
S(i) ≥
2k+1 − 1
2k + 1
S(S)
Since Γ(n−1) has n− 1 participants with n− 1 ≥ 2k + k− 2,
we see that some share is at least as large as O(n/ log2 n) the
size of the secret.
Corollary 7. For all n ≥ 4, there exist quantum secret
sharing schemes with information rate upper bounded by
O((log2 n)/n).
Classically the techniques used to study of bounds on secret
sharing schemes often rely on information theoretic inequali-
ties of the Shannon entropy. Furthermore, there is a larger set
of tools available such as polymatroids that make it possible to
derive general results. Unfortunately in the study of quantum
secret sharing schemes, these tools are either difficult to apply
or either inapplicable. For this reason it is interesting that we
have been able to use the von Neumann entropic inequalities
to prove Theorem 6.
B. Bounds for Special Cases: n = 4, 5
Often the study of small instances can reveal interesting in-
sights. For this reason we now consider the access structure
for n = 4, to derive some slightly tighter bounds than the ones
obtained in Theorem 6.
Theorem 8. Any realization of the quantum minimal access
structure Γ(4) or its purification must have some share of size
50% larger than the size of secret.
Γ4min = {(1, 2); (1, 3); (2, 3, 4)} (22)
Proof. The purification of Γ(4)min is given by Γ
(4)
min =
{(1, 2); (1, 3); (2, 3, 4); (2, 3, p); p(1, 4, p)}. First we observe
that Γ(4)min is a realizable quantum access structure as any two
authorized sets have a nonempty intersection. Furthermore, it
can be easily verified that it is also a self-dual access structure.
Consider now the sets A0 = {1, 2, 3}, B0 = {2, 3, 4}. Both
these sets are authorized sets while A0 ∩ B0 = {2, 3} is not
authorized. Therefore by Lemma 4, we have
S(1, 2, 3) + S(2, 3, 4) ≥ S(1, 2, 3, 4) + S(2, 3) + 2S(S).
Consider now the sets A1 = {2, 3} and B1 = {3, 4}. By the
subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy we obtain
S(2, 3) + S(3, 4) ≥ S(2, 3, 4) + S(3). (23)
Adding the previous two inequalities we obtain
S(1, 2, 3) + S(3, 4) ≥ S(1, 2, 3, 4) + S(3) + 2S(S)(24)
This can be rewritten as
S(1, 2, 3)− S(3) ≥ S(1, 2, 3, 4)− S(3, 4) + 2S(S)(25)
Consider now the sets A2 = {1, 2} and B2 = {1, 3} which
are both in Γ(4)min, while A2 ∩ B2 = {1} is unauthorized. Ap-
plying Lemma 4 we obtain
S(1, 2) + S(1, 3) ≥ S(1, 2, 3) + S(1) + 2S(S). (26)
5By the subadditivity inequality we have
S(1) + S(3) ≥ S(1, 3). (27)
Adding the previous two equations we obtain
S(1, 2) + S(3) ≥ S(1, 2, 3) + 2S(S), (28)
which can be rewritten as
S(1, 2) ≥ S(1, 2, 3)− S(3) + 2S(S). (29)
Now let us add the equations (25), and (29) to obtain
S(1, 2) + S(3, 4) ≥ S(1, 2, 3, 4) + 4S(S). (30)
By Lemma 3, S(1, 2, 3, 4) = S(p)+S(S) ≥ 2S(S). Further,
applying the subadditivity inequality to S(1, 2) and S(3, 4)
we can reduce the previous equation to
S(1) + S(2) + S(3) + S(4) ≥ 6S(S) (31)
Finally, the non-negativity of S(·) implies at least one of the
entropies S(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 must be greater than their average
6S(S)/4. Thus at least some share of Γ(4) and Γ(4) must at
least 50% larger than the size of the secret.
Theorem 6 predicts that Γ(4) will have an information rate
of 5/7 ≈ 0.714, while the above result shows that it can be at
most 2/3 ≈ 0.667.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the sizes of shares for quan-
tum secret sharing schemes. We showed that there exist access
structures, on n participants, for which the size of the share
grows as O(n/ log2 n). To the best of our knowledge, these
bounds represent the strongest lower bounds on the size of
a share (equivalently upper bounds on the information rate).
Some questions suggested by these results are the tightness
of these bounds and the schemes for realizing these access
structures with information rates close to the bounds. We will
address these questions elsewhere. We hope that this work
highlights the fact that there is a significant gap between the
upper bounds and lower bounds for the information rate of
(perfect) quantum secret sharing schemes and motivates fur-
ther research in this direction.
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